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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Advisory Group Members

SUBJECT : Minutes of the 23 August and 24 August 1976  
Executive Advisory Group Meetings

1. The Executive Advisory Group (EAG) met on 23 August 1976 for its second session on Goals for the CIA (EAG 3). Following a general discussion of two papers, it was agreed that the Comptroller's Office would circulate a new draft for consideration by members at the EAG meeting of Friday, 27 August, if possible.

2. On 24 August, the EAG met to discuss the proposed response (EAG 4) by the SIGINT Task Force [ ] to the House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations (S&I) Staff report dealing with transfer of CIA SIGINT responsibilities to NSA. A number of comments and suggestions were made concerning the proposed response. Following the discussion, Mr. Knoche asked that the proposed response be redrafted to omit discussion of CIA SIGINT accomplishments at this time but to include a factual discussion of errors and misstatements contained in the House report and to highlight important factors and considerations not treated adequately in the S&I report. A revised draft will be prepared by [ ] for review by EAG members.

3. The next scheduled meeting of the EAG will be on Friday, 27 August, at 4:30 p.m. in the DCI Conference Room. The subject will be DDI Plans.

[ ]  
James H. Taylor  
Secretary  
Executive Advisory Group

cc: [ ]

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
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August 25, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Executive Advisory Group

FROM : Sayre Stevens  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Analysis in the DDI: Problems and Issues

1. One of my first orders of business as DDI has been to undertake a fresh examination of the process and product of the directorate's principal activity: analysis. I have sought the individual and collective counsel of many colleagues, and together we have developed some ideas about what might be done in coming years to improve the quality and utility of our analytical efforts.

2. This paper summarizes the initial results of our brainstorming. It proposes several basic objectives to serve as guidelines for a program to raise the level of our analysis and make it more responsive to the present and future needs of our consumers. It identifies a number of obstacles that seem to stand in the way of progress toward these objectives, and it then explores potential solutions--some procedural, others involving major organizational changes. Finally, it

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poses several basic policy issues that must be resolved by senior management before we move ahead.

OBJECTIVES

3. Our critique of the directorate's intelligence products and the way we approach the analytical process revealed four areas in which substantial improvement seems imperative:

One: We need to pursue multidisciplinary analysis in a more rigorous and institutionalized manner, without destroying existing centers of professional coalescence. There is a growing demand from our consumers for intelligence products that integrate all the relevant factors affecting many major issues.

Two: We need to improve the way we select analytical problems and allocate resources to them so as to give better support to policy-makers. This means not only being more responsive to the perceived needs of policy-makers but also anticipating their needs and giving them longer lead times to ponder emerging concerns and potential problems.

Three: We need to insure a more "adventurous" stance in our analysis and presentation. The DDI is lagging behind in the application of modern techniques available in other analytical professions and in the communications field. We

also tend to limit our papers to traditional subjects and analytical frameworks and hesitate to push out into broader fields of analysis.

Four: We need to strengthen the "analytical ethos" in the directorate. Analysis must be our central function. It must be accorded the highest priority in time, talent, and resources, and not take second place to administration or staff work. Our organizational structure and incentive systems should reflect this priority, not only for producers of finished intelligence but also for the indispensable elements that support analysis.

#### OBSTACLES

4. There are a number of features about our present organization and operating style that impede our achievement of these objectives.

#### A. Obstacles to Objective One: More Multidisciplinary Analysis

(1) The artificial splitting of analytical responsibilities and subjects along organizational lines.

For understandable reasons, our production components are, for the most part, organized vertically by discipline: economists in one office, political scientists in another, military specialists and geographers in other separate

offices. In the present DDI culture, these elements tend to work relatively independently, developing their own research programs, conducting their own analysis, and publishing their own papers. As a result, there is a tendency to have overlapping responsibilities, duplications, and, more importantly, a lack of substantive input from other offices.

Furthermore, the present structure does not facilitate imaginative analysis which would draw on disciplines not represented in the directorate. This is most strikingly true in the cases of weapons analysis and foreign technology assessment. But other important factors are also routinely left out of our consideration. The behavioral sciences, for example, get short shrift in DDI products, even though some of the more important questions of foreign attitudes and policies ultimately come down to psychological and sociological factors.

The result is that finished intelligence products tend to be limited in scope to the frame of reference of the analyst or his organization. This approach may be adequate for projects where the consumer's requirement is fairly narrow and falls within the expertise of a single analytical element. Many policy issues, however,

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are much broader than that, and the policymaker is left to his own devices--if he does so at all--to develop an integrated appreciation of the factors bearing on the issues he confronts.

Over the years efforts have been made to increase the amount of interaction and joint work, but they have not been notably successful. An experiment with multidisciplinary country teams, for example, proved a failure after a year of trying. The Office of Political Research was formed in part to produce more broadly based analysis, but OPR still does not interact extensively with the other production offices. While there has been an increase in joint studies between offices, the DDI is not organized to encourage multidisciplinary analysis, which remains sporadic and largely dependent on the initiative of individuals.

(2) The lack of dialogue during the early stages of analysis. To a large extent, this problem is a subset of the first one, particularly for projects which involve more than one office. Our structure does not have adequate mechanisms and incentives for analysts to get together on a problem at the start of the analytical process to share each other's knowledge and insights.

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B. Obstacles to Objective Two: Improved Selection  
of Analytical Problems

(1) The inadequacy of mechanisms for deciding what analysis should be done to best serve our consumers and for setting priorities. Obviously, much of our work is-- and should be--in response to specific requests from policymakers. But we have a responsibility to do more than that: we need to look ahead to determine what policymakers should concern themselves about and do the work needed to inform them on such matters. Our track record in this area is uneven, principally because we lack the institutional means and flexibility to insure that the work of the directorate is focused on the right questions, and to allocate resources accordingly.

(2) The difficulty of serving diverse consumers with our products. Many of our papers are tailored for a specific audience and written in the jargon and level of detail appropriate for that audience. In so doing, we often fail to communicate the relevance of our findings to a broader or higher level clientele.

(3) The tendency to let current demands interfere with research. There are some who believe that we devote an inordinate amount of our resources to "reporting the



news" and not enough to providing rigorous analyses of developments. Even the research components of the directorate find it difficult to pursue sustained analysis because they are constantly being tasked to respond to ad hoc demands such as drafting estimates, supporting the NIOs, and answering NSC queries. We must, of course, be responsive to legitimate demands such as these, but we need to find ways to insure that we strike a proper balance between investing in research and spending our capital on other tasks.

C. Obstacles to Objective Three: More Adventurous Analysis and Presentation

(1) The gulf between new methodologies and "real" day-by-day analysis. It's not that the directorate has neglected to investigate new analytical techniques in the past few years, but rather that it has not managed to put them into serious and sustained use as an integral part of the analytical process. In many cases, new methodologies are little more than "showpieces" that attest to our interest but remain on the shelf.

(2) The lack of a comprehensive program for developing and implementing new presentational means. Various elements of the DDI have taken initiatives to investigate--

and in some cases adopt--new media and techniques for getting our messages across to our consumers. Some good work has been done, but we remain far behind what is happening in the communications field. Our lag in this area has not gone unnoticed by critics.

We treat presentation as a matter for each office to handle on its own. For the managers of production offices, presentation tends to be a secondary concern, and the efforts so far have been piecemeal and uncoordinated. We lack a mechanism for bringing adequate expertise and resources to bear on the problem in a way that would serve the entire directorate.

D. Obstacles to Objective Four: Strengthening the Analytical Ethos

(1) The cumbersome review process. The number of reviewers a paper must pass through before being published borders on the absurd. Office chiefs, division chiefs, branch chiefs, and sometimes section chiefs all get involved, and editorial processing is added to that. It is not uncommon to have a paper bounce up and down this ladder for five or six months before being approved. Each layer of management justifiably feels responsible for the work of its people and wants to insure quality

control, but the process occupies too much of our analytical resources, and hurts the timeliness of our products.

(2) The overorganized management structure.

The shortcomings of the review process are symptomatic of a larger problem: the excessive layers in our management structure. We are too highly organized to get on with our job efficiently. Part of the reason for this may be our promotion system, which requires that we move our good people into supervisory or staff positions if they are to advance. This system creates a bureaucratic imperative to proliferate supervisory and staff slots-- and the layers they control.

(3) Shortcomings in analytical skills and substantive expertise. Some critics of DDI analysis contend that our ability to do first-class research in some areas is declining. They perceive, for example, a need for more people able to do sophisticated analysis, a decline in language abilities, a growing shortage of competent area specialists, and a need for more adequate training programs for developing the kinds of skills and knowledge we need. The problem is exacerbated by a tendency to divert our best analysts to non-analytical tasks. Because most of

the current intelligence reporting carries little analytical content, basic analytical skills have not been valued appropriately in substantial portions of the directorate. The importance of these skills must be reaffirmed. Moreover, it is becoming clear that we need to maintain cadres in certain critical specialties and shield them from the distractions of ephemeral demands.

POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT

5. The system has been changing, particularly in recent years, to meet new demands and deal with old problems. We do not rule out the possibility that the evolutionary process, coupled with a series of procedural changes, could over time put us where we want to be without the disruption of a reorganization. We will later suggest some procedural innovations, but we have found through experience that they do not usually hit at the heart of the problem and that structural changes in some form may be necessary.

6. An earlier attempt to pursue multidisciplinary analysis through the creation of ad hoc teams, for example, simply did not work. Because the teams were not assigned to specific projects and met mainly to exchange views, they were artificial in nature and too dominated by the present organizational

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structure. Some regularized mechanism, organizationally instituted, seem necessary. Although procedural changes probably could help us establish a better mechanism for selecting problems to address, the real cultural change that would be a vital part of a more effective selection process could probably come about only through a shakeup of the existing system.

7. To achieve our third objective--a more adventurous stance in adopting new approaches to analysis and presentation--some revision of the present setup seems desirable. It is true that new methodologies need to be rooted in specific disciplines and probably can flourish in the present environment, but there is so much fragmentation in the effort to develop new presentational means that we have not been able to move out vigorously in this field.

8. Finally, we see a direct relation between our objective of strengthening the "analytical ethos" and the need for reorganizing. There is, we think, a strong argument for a fairly dramatic uprooting of the "bureaucracy" if we are to change deeply ingrained ways of thinking.

9. In short, to achieve all of our stated objectives in satisfactory and timely fashion, some degree of reorganization may be required. Such reorganization could take several forms.

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Of the various options discussed below, the first three are aimed primarily at strengthening multidisciplinary analysis and secondarily the analytical spirit of the directorate.

Geographic Organization

10. One option would be a reorganization along primarily geographic lines. A logical realignment would be to divide the directorate into two separate but equal parts, one dealing with Intelligence Services and one with Intelligence Production.

11. The Intelligence Services segment would combine the existing publications/cartographic elements in the DDI. It would publish all current intelligence, finished intelligence monographs, and periodicals as well as provide all cartographic and geographic services.

12. The Intelligence Production segment would redistribute the units of the present production offices into four geographic units: USSR/Eastern Europe; Western Europe and Western Hemisphere; Middle East/Africa/South Asia; and East Asia/Pacific. The activities of the two DDS&T production offices--OSI and OWI--would logically be incorporated in this setup. The special disciplines these offices represent would add depth and breadth to our multidisciplinary efforts. Another entity, the Office for International Programs, would integrate for the first time

work on problems of a genuinely international nature-- worldwide trade, monetary problems, Law of the Sea, and so forth.

13. Advocates of this approach argue that there is a geographic common denominator or thread for most DDI activities, and that questions from consumers and answers in the form of DDI products usually have a geographic focus. An organization along these lines would permit directorate offices to deal more effectively with counterparts within and outside the Agency, most of whom have a geographic alignment. Also, whatever competition, duplication, and overlapping of responsibility exist in the DDI would be reduced. Finally, and most importantly, a geographic organization would encourage multidisciplinary analysis and strengthen the regional focus of our analytical efforts.

14. There are, however, some very serious disadvantages. A geographic setup would fragment the disciplinary focus, which is apt to be dominant in much of our analysis. It would also limit professional growth in disciplines and specialties other than those centered on area studies, and we cannot afford any loss of these functional skills. Furthermore, this organizational scheme would require the replication of expensive tools, such as computer programming models, which are now centralized in

the existing offices and constitute the basis for much of our effort to develop new analytical techniques. Finally, it would be highly disruptive for the entire directorate.

Office of Multidisciplinary Analysis

15. Another approach to facilitate a crossdisciplinary approach to problems would be to establish an Office for Multidisciplinary Analysis organized on a geographic basis. Analysts, selected from their parent offices and representing various specialties and disciplines, would be assigned to the Center for a rotational tour. There would be a small permanent staff as well.

16. The virtue of this approach is that it is simple and would be only minimally disruptive. The establishment of a separate office directly tackles the problem of multidisciplinary analysis but at the same time keeps specialists in their own environment.

17. On the negative side, the base for doing genuinely crossdisciplinary work would be rather narrow, and little would be done to create a genuine multidisciplinary culture. Moreover, the directorate's management structure would remain overly large and cumbersome. It is likely, too, that the Office would become divorced from the real, day-to-day work of other DDI offices.



Matrix Scheme

18. Another possibility for reorganization aimed at encouraging multidisciplinary analysis would be a matrix arrangement which would preserve the individual offices but introduce some changes. The offices would be seen as parts of a vertical organization where the management function would reside and where "pure" analysis would be done by specialists. A large portion of the analysts in each of the offices, perhaps 60 percent, would be involved in doing research on a sole topic. Such research is critical because it is the foundation on which longer-term projects rest and is the building block for all other kinds of analysis. The rest of the analysts would be a "floating" labor force available to work on problems cutting across organizational lines.

19. Laterally, "program directors" with responsibility for cross-disciplinary research areas would organize projects responsive to a stated or felt requirement. The teams established for a particular project would be drawn from the floating labor pool. The final product would be produced under the direction of a project leader reporting to a program director, but the

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ultimate responsibility for professional content would belong to the appropriate offices. Everyone, including the program director, would be attached to a given office.

20. The matrix approach, like the proposal for an Office of Multidisciplinary Analysis, would directly grapple with the cross-discipline problem while preserving separate analytical disciplines. It has the added advantage of creating a multidisciplinary culture that reaches throughout the directorate without being divorced from line management. And it would free us from some of the rigidities of the present system by giving promising analysts a route upward that is not linked to supervisory positions--a concept that would give credence to our claim that analysis is indeed the central function of the DDI.

21. There are problems, however. Imposition of a matrix system would create turbulence and would require additional management at the directorate level. With analysts divided into specialists on the one hand and a floating pool of generalists on the other, the rise of a two-tiered system in which one group or the other becomes the elite seems almost inevitable. There

would also be a potential management conflict because responsibility would be divided between program/project leaders and office heads, both with certain responsibilities for substantive content of projects. Finally, the matrix scheme to some extent would duplicate the present NIO structure.

Current Intelligence Setup

22. The three reorganization options discussed above directly address the problem of fostering greater multidisciplinary analysis, but there is a separate problem that needs to be considered: the proper approach to current intelligence. The problem is a distinct one because we must weigh the need to report all kinds of news promptly and fully against the need to provide our consumers with in-depth analysis. Some claim that too many of our resources are now directed at the production of current intelligence.

23. If we decide that we do indeed devote too much of our effort to current reporting and not enough to current analysis, another possibility for reorganization would be to create a small White House and General Publications Support Staff to handle the more limited

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reporting function and free most of our current intelligence resources for more in-depth analysis. The Support Staff would be manned around the clock by analysts from the production offices of the DDI and DDS&T. A group of perhaps 20-25 middle-to-senior grade analysts would serve one or two year tours and then return to their parent organizations. These "hot flue" analysts would be responsible for drafting whatever daily and weekly products are issued.

24. If this kind of staff is created, some revision in the current intelligence publications would probably be necessary. We might, for example, find it necessary to abolish the National Intelligence Daily, OCI's newspaper, and instead report current intelligence by cable to our principal consumers around the clock. A daily compilation of the most significant cables could then be published for broader dissemination.

25. More detailed commentary and analyses of current developments--political, economic, and military--would be published twice a week in a new publication which would replace the various office weeklies and other periodicals. There might be a need for continuation of certain specialized publications such as OER's International Oil Developments, but the basic concept would be that

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directorate publications represent a "DDI product" and serve as the vehicle for publishing the work of the directorate.

26. Although some OCI analysts would be assigned to this new current staff, most of the analysts in that office would be combined with OPR into an Office of Regional Analysis. Such a merger would eliminate the anomaly of having two DDI offices engaged in political research and would encourage the production of more probing analysis. Creation of an Office of Regional Analysis would be quite compatible with the matrix proposal outlined earlier.

Office of Production

27. Under any of the above proposals for reorganization, it might be wise to consider establishing a separate Office of Production. The office would serve as a 24-hour processing center for DDI publications, with units for technical editorial review, machine processing, proofreading, layout, and preparation of graphics. Creating such an office would promote efficiency and perhaps would free resources that could then be devoted to the analytical effort. The Office of Production would also be the center for developing

and implementing new presentational techniques for the entire directorate. There would be a savings in equipment and the advantage of greater quality control over the finished product.

#### PROCEDURAL CHANGES

28. Whether or not we proceed with any organizational reforms at this point, there are certain procedural and administrative changes that can and should be made. One such change is already in effect--a weekly meeting between the DDI and the heads of the principal production offices to provide overall direction and focus to the substantive work of the directorate.

29. Other possibilities are suggested below:

--Tasking mechanism for the directorate.

The production group now meeting weekly could be given an additional function, that of serving as a tasking mechanism for projects undertaken by the directorate, thereby ensuring the proper assigning of priorities to given programs.

--Periodic review of publications and projects. Rather than the hurried

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reviews of recent years that usually were the result of a request from on high or from Congress or the White House, the DDI could institute a program for regularly reviewing all of its publications and research projects to see whether they continue to meet the needs of the principal consumers.

--Consumer seminars for evaluation of DDI products. There is a pressing need for more feedback from our consumers on what publications and products they value, which they ignore, what they wish they had, and why. On a regular basis, one-to-two day seminars involving key consumers and office heads could be held to discuss such questions.

--Review of our hiring practices. We need to take a hard look at the kinds of people we are hiring to be sure that we are getting the proper mix of people-- behavioral scientists as well as

political scientists, for example.

To pursue multidisciplinary studies we must ensure that all of our analysts don't come out of the same mold.

--Increased intra-directorate rotational assignments. Despite constant exhortations from the top and general recognition that rotations offer advantages to almost everyone, there is no practical and realistic scheme for promoting such assignments. The cross-fertilization that could result from tours ranging from 3 months to 2 years could both promote multidisciplinary analysis and break down some of the barriers between the production and service offices.

--More cross-fertilization with the outside world. The emphasis on current intelligence and the pressures of publications and deadlines too often make contact with outsiders--particularly the academic world--difficult. The directorate could profit from a well-thought-out seminar



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program involving different offices in the DDI and outside specialists on a regular basis.

--More creative training. The directorate should enlarge and enhance the talents of its existing analysts through a more innovative approach to training. One way to foster greater multidisciplinary analysis, for example, is to give analysts training in disciplines outside their specialties--train political scientists in some of the more important economic concepts, let economists learn more about geography, and military strategists more about political dynamics. At the same time, we need to retain and strengthen our regional expertise.

--Renewed emphasis on language capability. Enhanced language skills also fall in the category of "things we need to improve in the DDI but do little about." There is no rational plan for encouraging analysts to sharpen old skills or learn new ones.

--Greater contact between the DDI and office analysts on substance. To underline our contention that the heart of the DDI is analysis, regular and continuing contact between the DDI himself and analysts engaged in substantive projects should be instituted.

--Expansion of opportunities for overseas tours. Although the likelihood of additional overseas posts on a two-to-three year basis is minimal, the directorate could attempt to negotiate with the DDO and the Department of State for additional short tours of 3 months or so such as those OCI's East European and Soviet specialists have been taking for the last several years.

ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED

30. As you can see, we have developed a number of ideas and options for consideration. We have also undertaken some preparatory steps. We're collecting data, for example, that will give us a better grasp of what kind of

people we have on board, what their area of expertise is, how much time we spend on producing certain kinds of intelligence, what priorities we attach to various positions, and whether an independent production office is feasible. We have contracted [ ] consulting firm to do a study on the DDI organizational setup and will provide them with the results of our labors. We are also planning a review of all our publications. At this point, what we need is some guidance from you.

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31. Before the directorate decides which way to move as it comes to grips with its problems, there are certain issues that the Executive Advisory Group should address.

A. To what extent should the practice of current intelligence as the art of "tending the hot flue" be de-emphasized? Do we want to move away from this aspect--the "news" function--in favor of a more genuinely analytical product? What are the consequences of shifting the emphasis away from interpretive current reporting toward current analysis? At this point, is there any real possibility that we could eliminate the National Intelligence Daily or some version of a slick, well-packaged daily publication for our consumers?

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B. Should we rely upon the NIOs to solve the problem of operating across organizational lines?

Does the CIA have a responsibility for solving these problems within its own house without relying on the NIO structure?

C. To what extent should CIA extend its research and analysis beyond the classical intelligence topics to address other foreign and global issues of concern to national policymakers? Should the directorate, for example, be as concerned about scarce natural resources as it is about the possibility of a Communist government in Italy? Produce as much on agricultural production as it does on military sales? Learn as much about population problems as it does about foreign political parties? And if attention is paid to such a diversity of topics, will the DDI and indeed the Agency be that much less well-informed on critical issues?

D. Should the production offices of the DDS&T be somehow integrated into the DDI production processes? Would such integration require that these offices be transferred to the DDI? And, if so,

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would the separation from the R&D and data processing activities of the DDS&T unacceptably weaken our capabilities in science and technology?

E. Should we endeavor to expand the areas in which we produce "national" (i.e. coordinated inter-agency) intelligence? Would the Agency lose its unique role as an objective observer and interpreter of events if it regularly coordinated longer range studies with agencies that have a decided stake in any intelligence prediction?

F. How much effort should we make to put the DDI and the Agency in the forefront of new presentational means and analytic techniques? Is it worth a major investment in terms of resources in fields that are so experimental that the ultimate pay-off could be minimal or at least peripheral to our real mission?

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18 August 1976


MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : DDI and EAG

1. I am looking forward to the first of our sessions next week at EAG dealing with the DDI, its problems, and your proposed solutions. I gather from our brief discussions of recent days that you and Paul have had a lot of fun poking into new possibilities concerning the product and your organization.

2. As in the case of all EAG topics, I want you to feel free to explore all avenues and issues without regard to the degree of controversy surrounding them. It goes without saying that each of us in the EAG must learn to feel comfortable in discussing subjects which each of us knows may cause some pain for individual members.

3. In this respect, in discussing the product and the organization of our analysis forces, you should be sure to bring up the question of what to do with DDS&T production offices. The basic question, of course, is should they stay where they are or should they move?

  
E. H. Knoche

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cc: Comptroller  
DDS&T

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